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Abstract:
This paper explores the lost history of New England hurricanes and how the “return” of
hurricanes challenged understandings of the environmental vulnerabilities of coastal
communities and weather. A series of severe New England hurricanes from 1938-1954 forced
Rhode Islanders to reassess coastal vulnerabilities and protection strategies. Before the hurricane
of ’38, Rhode Islanders lived with the vulnerability of seasonal erosion and winter storms, but
believed their state was, and would remain, safe from hurricanes. In a new era of the shore-atrisk, the Army Corps of Engineers re-wrote the forgotten history of coastal dangers. Dense
development along Narragansett Bay and the economic incentives to safeguard Providence,
Rhode Island’s only large city, led state and federal authorities to address the environmental
vulnerabilities wrought by hurricanes. The result was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’
pathbreaking analysis of the tidal dynamics of Narragansett Bay. Investigating human responses
to coastal environmental threats, this paper reveals the political and engineering histories that
attempted to reconcile hurricanes, risk, and coastal vulnerability in the state at midcentury.
Keywords: Rhode Island, Hurricanes, Army Corps of Engineers, New England
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On September 21, 1938, the impossible happened: a hurricane hit southern New England.
At the time, most Rhode Islanders believed it was impossible for such a storm to occur in this
northeastern corner of the United States. One resident recalled that she, a young woman at the
time, had schooled her father, a Florida man, for suspecting the storm was a hurricane. She told

him “don’t be silly. In Rhode Island we don’t have hurricanes.” 1 As Santo Amato, another
resident explained, “I don’t think two out of two hundred people actually believed or realized
that it could happen. And it did.” 2 Underestimating the 1938 storm’s path and intensity, the U.S.
Weather Bureau officially downgraded the hurricane to a tropical storm in its morning forecast
on the 21st, and chose not to issue a warning on the possibility of a major weather threat. 3 The
storm, however, proved devastating and deadly for Rhode Island, neighboring Long Island, and
the rest of New England. By afternoon, the storm ominously appeared on the horizon. Decades
later a survivor recalled the odd feeling of its low barometric pressure and the color of the sky, a
“frightening dark gray—an odd gray—like nothing that I had seen before.” 4 Hurricanes alter
landscapes in three ways: winds that can top 100 miles per hour rip trees from the ground and
roofs from houses; torrential rain produces floods; and the sea, which rises before the wind,
produces storm surges and floods that destroy buildings and infrastructure. 5 The September ‘38
hurricane brought these dangers into stark relief; it proved to be one of the deadliest and most
destructive storms ever to hit New England.
The two decades following the ‘38 storm fundamentally remade coastal history in Rhode
Island. These decades marked the end of the era in which this region existed without hurricanes,
a perspective based on a collective forgetting of local weather history. This article explores both
this lost history and how the “return” of hurricanes to New England challenged understandings
of the environmental vulnerabilities of coastal communities due to weather. The late 1930s
ushered in a new era in which hurricanes became a fundamental part of coastal management. But
as the Army Corps of Engineers, state and federal legislators, and residents grappled with a
series of powerful hurricanes, governance and coastal management initiatives butted up against
divergent understandings of the nature of Rhode Island’s littoral.
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Fig. 1. The state of Rhode Island, in southeastern New England.
Adapted from Google Maps.

Rhode Island is nicknamed the Ocean State. No point in it is more than twenty-five miles
from the shore. As the U.S.’s smallest state, Rhode Island is only thirty-seven miles wide and
forty-eight miles long (Fig. 1). Its eastern side is U-shaped, filled with the 176 square-mile
Narragansett Bay. The state has nearly 400 miles of shoreline, forty of which are oceanfronting—the majority fronts the bay. The sea has long shaped life in Rhode Island. The naval
base in Newport, the state’s primary harbor to the south, existed due to Narragansett Bay’s deep
navigable mouth, while Providence, the state capital, influenced the economy as one of Rhode
Island’s two most important commercial ports at the northern end of the bay. Until 1938 Rhode
Islanders had lived with the vulnerability of seasonal erosion and winter Nor’easters, but not
hurricanes. In the early twentieth century, hurricane landfall in New England was relatively rare
compared to landfalls in Florida and along the Gulf Coast. No significant hurricanes hit Rhode
Island in the first three decades of the century. As a result, the state was unprepared in 1938for
the damage its coastal waters could inflict when magnified by a hurricane.
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To examine how forgetting and remembering coastal risk shaped community and
governmental responses to hurricanes in Rhode Island, this article brings together Army Corps of
Engineers history with the complementary, and often intersecting, scholarship of coastal risk,
disaster studies, and memory studies. In the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. government tasked
the Corps with designing structural solutions to address hurricanes. The history of the Corps’
work on Narragansett Bay reveals the complexity of the agency’s approach to the coast: its
ambitions, its attention to environmental dynamics—unusually comprehensive for the era—, and
its predisposition to hard protective structures. 6 The Corps’ critics point to such structures as
evidence of the agency’s misguided, technocratic faith in its ability to control the environment.
Disaster scholars have, in turn, investigated how structural responses, such as barriers designed
to control storm surge, can generate a misguided sense of security among residents, leading to
increased floodplain development. 7 The Corps’ mid-century Rhode Island work reveals how the
agency advanced scientific understanding of littoral environments while also advancing the
assumption that engineering feats could make even hurricane-prone coasts safe for development.
Memory and disaster studies illuminate how collective memories of flooding and
hurricanes shape community preparedness for future disasters. Scholars of coastal risk
underscore that disasters like the ‘38 hurricane have long histories. 8 The scale and severity of
hurricane damage is shaped by human decisions about where and how to build. Devastating
storms, Andy Horowitz writes in his history of 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, are discrete
meteorological events, but “who is in harm’s way is the product of political decisions and social
arrangements.” 9 Scholars of community memory and disaster argue that resilient communities
sustain collective or social memories that ensure such past decisions and social arrangements
inform future preparation. Yet a robust social memory can be difficult to maintain, as geographer
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Lindsey McEwen and her colleagues show, when events are not “actively remembered” but
“actively forgotten.” 10 French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who developed the theory of
collective memory in the 1920s-1940s, contended that one reason memories survive is the extent
to which they are indexed into architecture and physical space, particularly in concert with living
memory, material records, monuments, and ruins. 11 In terms of disaster history, environmental
historian Christof Mauch argues that
memory of natural disasters is, in contrast to the memory of war, markedly shortlived…There are no veterans’ associations and but few memorials to keep alive
the memory of great natural disasters; similarly, catastrophes caused by nature
frequently receive no mention whatsoever in history books. In this way acute
disasters at any given time eclipse destructive natural phenomena that occurred in
the past. 12
Rhode Island’s lost hurricane memory lessened regional preparedness and resilience to storm
damage in 1938. In the 1950s and 1960s the state, via the Corps, historicized this new era of the
shore-at-risk as part of its attempt to protect Narragansett Bay from hurricanes.
This article explores the process of remembering New England hurricanes and the uses,
as well as the limits, of those memories in mitigating coastal risk. At midcentury, the Corps rewrote the history of coastal dangers in Rhode Island via a hurricane protection plan. The 1930s
through the 1950s ushered in a new era in which hurricane dangers became a fundamental part of
Rhode Island coastal living, federal response to coastal hazards, and risk mitigation. The
hurricane history the Corps unearthed and the hurricane barrier it ultimately completed in
Providence in 1966 became repositories of social memory. The subsequent modest impact of
remembered hurricane hazards on coastal land use suggest, however, the power of “active
forgetting,” the choice to ignore coastal dynamics and residual risk, as the lure of the ocean and
bay endured.
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The Ocean State and New England Hurricanes
The September 21, 1938 hurricane hit in an unprepared Rhode Island at 4:00 p.m.. The
storm made landfall twice—once on Long Island and once in Connecticut. The second landfall
brought the storm’s most damaging winds and storm surge to bear on western Rhode Island. The
hurricane took 250 lives in Rhode Island and more than 600 across New England. 13 Since it hit
in late September, the Ocean State’s seasonal residents had largely left its beach and bayfront
summer colonies, or the death toll would have been significantly higher. The storm demolished
homes, roads, piers, and fishing boats. In normal conditions, Narragansett Bay is characterized
by lower wave energy and less erosion than the state’s ocean-fronting coast, but the hurricane
temporarily altered the nature of the bay while also magnifying Atlantic coast erosion. Storm
surge roared up the bay. One Rhode Islander recalled that before the storm “there were thirty
homes along the Potowoment Beach…[on the bay]—and they were completely washed way.
There was nothing there but the stilts and some of the foundations…It’s a fantastic sight. And
that same condition existed going all the way down into South County.” 14 The damage was
extreme. Morgan Garrett, working as a firefighter at the time of the storm, remembered “seeing
the houses smashed to pieces. It just seemed impossible that such a thing could happen.” 15 On
the state’s southwestern Atlantic coast, the stormed wiped Misquamicut Beach, Napatree Point,
and Charlestown Beach clean of human habitation (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2. The destruction at Cole River (top), and Misquamicut Beach (bottom) after the 1938 Hurricane. Cole River is
in Warren, a town near the mouth of the Providence River, at the top of Narragansett Bay. Storm-surge swept debris
buried the buildings along the river. At Misquamicut Beach, in Westerly in the southwestern corner of the state, the
stretch of bungalows that faced the Atlantic are simple gone. Source: Cole River in Warren, 1938 and Misquamicut
Weekapaug Wreckage (Westerly), 1938, Department of Public Works Hurricane damage photography. Courtesy of
the Rhode Island State Archives.

Rhode Islanders were unaware of and unprepared for the hurricane’s potential damage.
Residents only remembered the absence of storms in their lifetimes, rather than the longer
weather history that predated their experiential knowledge of the coast. Perris Dove claimed “on
Schlichting 7

the radio we had heard the word ‘hurricane’ mentioned. But being as in the New England Area
we had never had a hurricane, we just figured they were all to the south.” 16 Leona McElroy
Kelley further explained “we…had no idea even then what a hurricane could be…But I don’t
think we were aware enough of what nature could do and things had been status quo for years,
and we just figured it was going to go on.” 17 Scholars of memory and resiliency define “social
memory” as a collection of traumatic experiences of disruptive events. In the aftermath of a
disaster, social memory is a community resource “that draw[s] on reservoirs of practices,
knowledge, values and worldviews” that can sustain public awareness of risk (like floods or
hurricanes), enhance future responses to them, and mitigate future damage. 18 Rhode Islanders
who experienced the storm of September 1938 lacked such a social memory to prepare them the
destruction.
Ocean State residents expressed awe at how unprepared they were for the devastation of
the ‘38 hurricane; their regret was, in a way, a lament for a missing social memory. Marilyn
Fogel Schlossberg, who weathered the storm in Providence, recalled that when her father saw
water in the street, he thought it was a broken water main. The 1938 had storm caught the city
unawares; “no one,” according to a contemporary report, “appeared to have any idea that the city
was about to be literally torn up by the roots in spots and that Narragansett Bay was to roll up the
streets of downtown Providence.” 19 Four decades later in the late 1970s, oral history
interviewees expressed still-fresh amazement that New England could be so unprepared. As
another survivor explained “our generation had never seen or heard of one [a hurricane]. It just
came as a complete surprise.” 20 Interviewees also often expressed a sense of remorse or failure
about Rhode Islanders’ lack of knowledge. “Even Quonset Point Naval Air Base, with its
weathermen and everything else,” Ted Metcalf regretfully recalled, “We never heard a word
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about it. Wasn’t in the weather. Wasn’t in the news. Nothing. We could have boarded up. We
could have been prepared.” 21 Metcalf regretted that Rhode Island lacked the memories with
which to better weather hurricanes.
The meteorological conditions of the summer and fall of 1954 proved the ‘38 hurricane
was not a once in a lifetime event. Seventeen years after the ‘38 storm, three hurricanes hit the
Atlantic Coast, including the Ocean State, in summer and fall of 1954: Carol in August, Edna in
September, and Hazel in October. Like the 1938 storm, Carol hit nearly coincident with
gravitational high tide, causing significantly more severe flooding than Edna and Hazel. Both
storms produced flood levels of fifteen to sixteen feet above mean sea level at Providence. 22
After Hurricane Carol in August, Providence’s downtown district was declared a disaster area:
water inundated approximately 500 acres of the city’s industrial and commercial core. Twelve
feet of water covered a quarter of downtown. Of the total flood damage suffered around
Narragansett Bay, Providence shouldered nearly a third of it. If the hurricane floods of the
1930s-1950s were to reoccur, Providence would suffer damages totaling approximately $220
million. 23 The return of hurricanes inspired a reassessment of coastal environmental hazards. The
storm physically reshaped the Rhode Island shoreline, but it also transformed the state’s coast
into a landscape of far greater vulnerability, although this new reality unfolded across nearly two
decades.
The destructive storms of 1954 forced Americans to build a new social memory of New
England hurricanes. Hurricanes no longer hit only the still-comparatively-undeveloped shores of
the south, of Florida, Texas, and South Carolina, but the center of the nation’s power and
populations, the urbanized Atlantic coast. A mid-1950s Yale University City Planning Survey
designated the entire 600-mile area of the eastern seaboard from Portland, Maine, to Norfolk,
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Virginia, as a single, linear city containing one-fifth of the Nation's population.” 24 In density of
population at midcentury, Rhode Island ranked first in the nation. By the 1950s the rate of
urbanization in the bay’s coastal zone and the reappearance of hurricanes brought to light the
environmental hazards inherent to Rhode Island’s coast.

The Army Corps and Recovered Hurricane Risk in Rhode Island
No longer omitted from local memories, the potential danger of New England hurricanes
became starkly apparent. The 1938 storm spurred Congress to authorize an Army Corps study to
historicize and protect against hurricanes; the hurricanes of 1954 additionally moved the U.S.
Weather Bureau to study hurricanes and provide guidance on risk reduction. While the Corps
had studied coastal engineering since the 1930s, hurricanes officially became part of its
protection program in 1955 with the passage the Bush Hurricane Survey Act, an act that
specified the storms of ‘54 as its inspiration. 25 In the same year, 1955, congressmen from New
England sponsored a bill that funded the Weather Bureau’s new National Hurricane Research
Project (NHRP) to advance scientific understanding of hurricane formation, improve forecasting,
and coordinate hurricane studies across various offices and agencies within the bureau. 26 While
the NHRP focused primarily on weather science, like the Corps it also endeavored to assess
community exposure to hurricane dangers and maximize community hurricane preparedness—it
even drafted a model coastal community hurricane plan. 27 The NHRP ran parallel to the Corps’
hurricane protection research. 28 NHRP researchers acknowledged that the infrequency of
damaging hurricanes inhibited social memories of such threats. Both the NHRP and the Corps’
work were a means by which the government hoped to booster hurricane preparedness in coastal
communities.
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The Bush Hurricane Survey Act of 1954 marked the culmination of more than two
decades of the Corps’ growing influence in coastal issues. Congress had first empowered the
Corps to address coastal erosion in 1930 with the of establishment of its Shore Protection Board
and Beach Erosion Board. 29 The agency’s research in erosion and storm surge effects, which
required work in the sciences of oceanography, meteorology, fluid mechanics, electronics, and
structural mechanics, helped establish the field of coastal engineering. 30 An agency history of the
Beach Erosion Board’s work between 1930 and 1960 claimed that the research spurred a “new
interpretation of the shore:” “[i]t was not the physical factors operating upon the coastline which
had undergone a dramatic change but rather man's perception of them…Increasingly, the ocean
generally, and the waves in particular, became depicted as ‘enemies’—threats which had to be
controlled to the greatest extent possible.” 31 That this reframing aligned with the seventeen-year
period of severe hurricanes between 1938 and 1954 may have been a coincidence, but the storms
must have seemed to validate the Corp’s expanded work.
The Bush Hurricane Survey Act expanded the Corps’ influence over the water-land
system of Narragansett Bay. At the time Congress passed the act, the Corps was already
investigating local proposals for harbor improvements and barriers on the bay under various
congressional resolutions. Existing projects included a feasibility study for deepening the
waterfront channel of Newport Harbor, and the possibility of small-boat harbors at Greenwich
Cove. 32 The Corps also maintained navigation channels in Providence and Taunton,
Massachusetts, on the east side of the bay, and had authored navigation reports necessary for the
construction of various breakwaters and jetties. In 1955, the New England-New York InterAgency Committee’s The Resources of the New England-New York Region identified the coast
as a public utility and the location of substantial economic investment in need of protection. This
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conclusion aligned with the Corps’ new directives. The New England Division organized a
Hurricane Protection Unit to investigate how hurricanes heightened the flood dynamics of the
bay. In the fall of 1955, survey teams set out to “make damage surveys based on the devastation
caused by recent hurricanes, economic studies to determined [sic] the feasibility of various
barrier proposals.” 33 The survey stood apart from the Corps’ earlier work on Narragansett Bay.
Rather than look at a specific protective structure, the report took the ambitious perspective that
the entire twenty-six mile-long and nearly seven-mile wide bay was a single unit that could have
a comprehensive protective infrastructure on a much larger scale. It was remarkable in that it was
based on an ecological understanding of the entire bay, a step towards conceptualizing it as a
large-scale environmental system. The survey, but one piece of the Corp’s late-1950s
Narraganset Bay hurricane protection studies, was the most extensive study of the bay
undertaken, and the largest coastal study ever undertaken by the Corps up to that point.
The Corps based its 1950s work on both scientific modeling and historical research that
unearthed forgotten New England weather dangers. This research had begun in the aftermath of
the ‘38 storm. In a 1939 survey, the Corps had uncovered a record of New England hurricanes by
combing through colonial histories and archival materials. Evidence of these storms, Corps
researchers had discovered, dated back to the August 1635 journal entries of William Bradford,
governor of Plymouth Colony. Three years later John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts
Bay Company, had also recorded a hurricane on Narragansett Bay. 34 Researchers found evidence
of tropical storms and gales of less intensity throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
And as evidence multiplied in the nineteenth century, the corps rediscovered an 1815 hurricane
and two in September 1821 alone. The extensive records of mid-nineteenth century storms
revealed that the hurricanes that reached New England between 1869 and 1938 diminished in
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intensity before landfall. Reconstructing a historical record of New England hurricanes had led
the Corps to conclude in 1939 that “during the period from l635 to 1900 hurricane flooding of
damaging proportions occurred nine times;” damaging hurricanes occurred at least every twentyyears, and severe storms every seventy-five. 35 Hurricanes had in fact always been there in New
England’s historical record; it was just that forgetting was also a fundamental part of the region’s
weather history. With this unearthed history, the potential danger of development at Rhode
Island’s water-land interface came into sharp relief.
By the 1950s the Corps looked to incorporate its research concerning historic New
England hurricanes into a comprehensive plan to mitigate storm effects on Narragansett Bay.
Researchers began by charting tidal patterns and volume and undertook a hydrographic survey to
measure and describe the bay’s physical features and predict change over time. The 1950s study
also included a damage survey. Corps members described the work as “essentially…a door-todoor inspection of the hundreds of industrial, commercial, residential and other properties
affected by the flood.” Analysis included property descriptions, extent and depth of flooding, the
nature and amount of damage, and relationships to prior flood levels. This damage survey was a
way to formalize local community memories into the new governmental records of hurricanes.
Corps researchers also calculated estimated costs that could be avoided if barriers were built to
prevent damage during a “standard project” hurricane. This recapitulation of past hurricane
meteorological and hydrological records inscribed memory of past damage into economic
justifications for protective structures. 36
Geographer Craig E. Colten argues that such coastal engineering research, development
policies, urban planning, and construction codes can all maintain memories of coastal risk. 37 In
addition to its historical survey and cost-benefits analysis, the Corps reestablished Rhode Island
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hurricane memories at midcentury through its research at the U.S. Waterways Experiment
Station (WES) in Vicksburg, Mississippi, where it built a model of Narragansett Bay. The scale
model, stretching 100 feet wide and 250 feet long and covering 15,000 square feet, reproduced
the contours and elevation of the bay floor and the 256-mile shoreline, as well as the streams
entering the 176 square-mile bay (Fig. 3). 38 The model let the Corps reinscribe hurricane floods
on Narragansett Bay. This project of “active remembering” reflected the agency’s belief that
hurricane and flood projections required awareness of the past so that neither the bay’s water, nor
memory, were mismanaged in a way that exacerbated coastal risk due to damaging storm surge.

Fig. 3: U.S. Waterways Experiment Station Model of Narragansett Bay.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, Hurricane Survey, Interim Report, Narragansett Bay Area: Rhode Island,
Massachusetts. Boston: The Division, 1957.

Once WES engineers successfully modeled typical conditions of the bay system, they began
investigating how climate events augmented the destructive power of Narragansett Bay waters.
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The model was of fixed-bed construction, meaning bank materials did not erode and no sediment
deposition occurred. It included a tide generator and a separate hurricane tide generator. To
analyze potential hurricane flood levels, the Corps reproduce the bay’s typical stream current and
tidal actions as well as the impact of historic storms on these patterns with the model. Using its
1939 historic survey of hurricanes, the Corps collected data on the twenty-nine storms that had
caused high tides in Providence. The Corps understood that the energy reaching the coast via
typical wind and wave patterns could increase during storms, and such high energies made
coastal zones vulnerable to storm surge.
The WES study revealed that the southern New England shore was not hurricane-free but
in fact the nation’s most hurricane-vulnerable coastline. Model tests and historic storm analysis
led the Corps to conclude that Narragansett Bay’s exposed location in the path of hurricanes and
its particular physical features were the cause of “devastating tidal floods.” 39 This condition, the
Corps realized, was the result of both the nature of northern hurricanes and the unique
geographic, geologic, and oceanographic characteristics of Rhode Island, which amplified storm
damage. Northern hurricanes move two to three times faster than southern hurricanes and have
enlarged wind fields. Additionally, hurricanes follow a mostly coast-normal track that carries
their more devastating right side across New England. The right side, or east side, of hurricanes
create the strongest weather. It is the side that moves most frequently across Rhode Island and
the rest of New England. The Corps determined that the topography of the bay compounded the
destructive potential of such storms. Since the bay opens directly to the south, hurricane waters
are able to funnel directly north. The bay, which tapers as it stretches inland, acts as a natural
funnel for hurricane storm surge, with Providence sitting straight in the path of this flood. In ‘38
and ‘54, storm surges between twelve and sixteen feet inundated the downtown business district.
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WES engineers concluded that a future flood could exceed recent floods by three feet and reach
elevations up to nineteen feet above mean sea level in Providence. 40 In its third phase of study,
the WES engineers built a variety of hurricane dams to scale in the model. Station engineers
tested the barriers with a tidal design flood of a twenty-knot speed storm due to such a storm’s
“higher elevation and greater volume at the mouth of the bay,” which created a design flood
capable of producing “a more severe test of barrier structures.” 41

Fig. 4: Protection of Narragansett Bay from hurricane surge—the proposed barriers for the bay.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, Hurricane Survey, Interim Report, Narragansett Bay Area: Rhode Island,
Massachusetts. Boston: The Division, 1957.
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Combining recent memories of the devastation of 1938 and 1954, historic records of
hurricanes, cost-benefit analysis, and hurricane flood modeling, the Corps built a scientific
understanding of hurricane impact on Rhode Island that it used to propose a series of hard
defenses for Narragansett Bay. The Corps concluded “[t]he only practical means of protecting”
Rhode Island’s coastal zone was through the construction of an ambitious network of tidal flood
barriers. The Corps recommended a series of Lower Bay barriers, with navigation openings,
across the three entrances to the bay (Fig. 4). The Corps estimated that bay barriers would
prevent more than 90% of the design flood damages of $126 million on the Bay (not including
Providence, which a separate barrier would protect). 42 The proposed Lower Bay barriers were
nevertheless secondary in importance to the need to protect the state capital. The Corps requested
authorization for the immediate construction of a Fox Point Barrier in downtown Providence
across the Providence River. The Corps declared the 2,800 foot wide storm surge barrier was
“urgently needed,” and that “[o]ne great flood would pay for the Fox Point project cost several
times over.”
The Lower Bay barriers presented the most difficult engineering challenges of the Corps’
Rhode Island protection proposal. The plan called for rock-filled dams with navigation openings
across the bay’s West and East Passages. Combined, the two barriers would require more than
thirteen million tons of stone. Gates would need to be built to close these navigation channels
before a hurricane. Since the Lower Bay was as deep as 160 feet, a gate large enough to fit the
Navy’s required 1,500 foot navigation opening was unprecedented. 43 The nearest comparable
installation was the dike built across Galveston Harbor, Texas, following the hurricane and storm
surge of September 1900. 44
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Providence’s concrete Fox Point Barrier, completed in 1966, was a pioneering example
of the hurricane protective works that the Corps successfully lobbied for in the mid-twentieth
century (Fig. 5). 45 The more ambitious Lower Bay barrier system, however, was never built.
Additional research concluded these barriers would not adversely affect fish and wildlife, tidal
flush, navigation, or naval requirements—an unusually comprehensive environmental study for
this pre-environmental impact statement era—but the fiscal and engineering challenges of the
project, protests from wealthy and politically-connected yachtsmen in Newport, and opposition
from state representatives, including Governor John H. Chafee, blocked the project. 46

That the proposed Lower Bay barriers were never built is somewhat misrepresentative of
mid-century shore protection trends. In this era, as historian Andrew Kahrl has shown, coastal
communities frequently demanded, “and state and federal officials (with rare exceptions) readily
agreed to,” large-scale coastal engineering protections. 47 In the 1950s hard structures like jetties,
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groins, breakwaters, and seawalls were accepted as the best means to protect coasts from storm
damage and erosion. But, as would become clear in the following decades, they also had the
potential to negatively impact coastlines they were meant to protect by interfering with littoral
processes, sometimes worsening flooding and erosion. The Corps’ critics often point to
structures like the proposed Lower Bay barriers as proof of the organization’s hubristic belief
that it could re-engineer any coastal environment. 48 At the same time, however, the Corps’ plan
also represented the agency’s efforts to reinscribe hurricane memory in coastal Rhode Island.
The Corps unearthed a history of New England hurricanes and built the Fox Point barrier as a
structural reminder of the risks of hurricane floods.
The Corps’ focus on storm surge drove the agency’s new approach to the relationship
between land and water on Narragansett Bay. From its establishment in the nineteenth century,
the agency had focused on navigation and had favored working with water over land—its
expertise was largely vested in flood projects. 49 And the Bush Hurricane Survey Act of 1954had
authorized the Corps to focus its tools and financial resources on flooding. Despite this narrow
focus, however, the agency’s approach was not hubristic in regards to other environmental
processes. The Corps made the first careful scientific study of the bay’s tides, channel depths and
hydrography, in other words the first comprehensive study of the water half of the land-water
interface, as part of this hurricane project. Corps scientists and engineers were aware that they
lacked a total understanding of how coastlines evolved naturally, never mind the effect of
humans on this long-term process. Their projects were attempts to not only understand coastal
processes and build a robust collective memory of the threat of hurricanes but to build memories
of how storms interacted with Rhode Island’s coasts into protective structures.
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While the Corps reports on Rhode Island hurricane hazards emphasized the bay’s tidal
dynamism, this view of the movement of water was not matched by the inclusion of coastal
change in the agency’s hazard mitigation plans. Due to the mechanics of littoral drift, coastlines
regularly shift. Waves and winds along the coast erode rock and deposit sediment on a
continuous basis, although rates of erosion and deposition vary considerably daily, seasonally,
and annually. Hurricane storm surge could also reshape the shore: the storm ‘38 cut Napatree
Point, on the southern side of Watch Hill Harbor, into three small islands. 50 Yet the Corps’ study
of Narragansett Bay focused only on flood tide dynamics. The environment of sand, dunes, and
salt marshes did not exist in the Corps’ report; neither did the ecological processes that
maintained these dynamic environments. WES engineers modeled the bay, New England’s
largest estuary, as an impervious landscape made of concrete. This reduction of the littoral to a
hard surface reflected a blind spot in the Corps’ perception of the nature of the bay. The model’s
hard shores did not acknowledge natural littoral movement, and WES reports did not address this
omission. Focused on but one aspect of the bay, water as flood tide, the Corps defined its water
as invading a space where it did not belong (Fig. 6). At mid-century Rhode Island “positioned
the sea as the enemy, aiming to construct projects that would keep water out, forming a hard line
between water and land.” 51 This framing ignored the fact that periodic flooding was inherent to
Rhode Island’s environment. 52
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Fig. 6: Government officials framed the Atlantic Ocean, and its weather, as Rhode Island’s enemy. Rhode
Island Development Council, The Governor's Study Committee's Interim Report: R.I. vs. Hurricanes
(1954). Report Courtesy of the RI State Archives, RI Development Council Records. This report is a reprint
of a previously published report circulated by the Providence Journal Bulletin in 1954.

As the Corps’ proposal for Narragansett Bay suggests, by 1960s the federal government
increasingly saw hurricanes as hazards that could be managed, no matter the scale of engineering
required, to protect against coastal flooding. And in this decade, another destructive hurricane
again pushed the federal government to ameliorate coastal risk, this time through flood
insurance. In the wake of 1965’s Betsy, the nation’s first billion-dollar hurricane, Congress
created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968 to offer low-cost insurance to
property owners in flood-prone areas, reduce federal disaster and flood control spending, and,
hopefully, discourage development in hazard zones. 53 While the NFIP’s flood insurance risk
maps (FIRMs) inscribing hurricane memory into real estate markets by demarcating hazardous
Schlichting 21

zones, the program did not reign in coastal development. As subsidized flood insurance lowered
the risk of owning coastal property, the economic benefits of development proved stronger than
risk mitigation. 54 Environmental scholars have framed the NFIP as an example of a “moral
hazard,” the lack of an incentive to avoid risk when a person has protection from the
consequences of that risk. 55 In 1977 the chairman of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources
Management Council John Lyons, a survivor of the ‘38 hurricane, expressed his frustration with
the program. “The intent … was to try to prevent people from building homes in highly
hazardous areas. But it’s had a direct opposite effect…by the nature of having insurance to insure
any kind of building on it, it’s made it possible for many people to build in this highly hazardous
area that wouldn’t be there if it wasn’t for the insurance.” 56 While Geographer Craig E. Colten
contends that the NFIP’s maps, based as they are on historical flooding and meteorological data,
“represent one form of flood memory,” geographer Susan Cutter points to the limits of the maps’
social memory. 57 Lyon’s 1977 observation speaks to Cutter’s argument that the government
spreads financial risk away from the coast via nationally-pooled insurance premiums, federal
disaster relief, and subsidy programs, coastal property owners are not asked to face the full cost
of their water views. 58
The late 1960s and early a 1970s ultimately marked a legislative turn to coastal zone
management at the federal level via the NFIP and the Coastal Zone Management Program
(CZMP). Yet the program shifted the focus in the coastal zone away from the physical attributes
of the dynamic coastal system—landscape receding inland from the shore, the waters of the bay,
and the submerged bay and ocean floor—to focus on governance mechanisms, like the NFIP,
that had limited success in lessening residents’ exposure to coastal risk. The physical
environment was largely absent from the CZMP, beyond general statements on the importance of
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preserving sensitive ecosystems and public beaches. The CZMC, like NFIP and the Corps’
Narragansett Bay hurricane study, shared a common goal in Rhode Island (and across the
nation): to protect coastal property. Yes hurricane barriers inscribed memories of past floods into
a landscape and FIRMS memorialized hurricane risks in real estate. But just as social memory
can be formalized into physical barriers or flood insurance regulations, nonenforcement or the
gradual dismantling of policies can erode resilience. And protective structures, while reminders
of hurricanes past, can also create a false sense of security, allow, as Colten and Amy Sumpter
argue, “social awareness of extreme and unsafe situations to fade, and diminish “individual
involvement in hazards preparation.” 59

The Limits of Hurricane Social Memory
Even after the mid-twentieth century forced Rhode Islanders to register hurricanes as part
of local community memory, this remembering did not necessarily reshape communities’
relationships to their environment. In the wake of the ‘38 hurricane a few Rhode Island localities
issued construction bans in the communities that had sustained the worst damage. For example,
the Westerly Town Council banned all building on Napatree Point, where the hurricane
destroyed more than 100 houses and storm surge had turned the barrier beach into a series of
islands. But in other communities, coastal property owners rejected redevelopment restrictions. 60
Rhode Islanders who in the 1970s recounted the trauma of the ‘38 hurricane, having also
lived through the three hurricanes of ‘54, split as to whether the state’s shores should continue to
be developed. Those who said the coast should not be developed pointed to the danger to human
life, the cost of government-backed insurance, and the complications of having to rescue coastal
residents in storms. Nancy Allen Holst recounted the grim work of looking for bodies in
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Charlestown Pond, the smell of the morgue, and the total destruction of East Greenwich’s
Frenchtown section, noting “the power of the water driven by tide and hurricane winds is
absolutely tremendous.” But when asked in the 1970s, if she would invest in waterfront property
she, like a number of interviewees, said, “Sure…If the people wanted to take a chance, it’s up to
them.” 61 Rhode Islanders struggled to reconcile their state’s reconstructed history of
environmental risk with traditional property rights associated with long-standing, if
misremembered, understanding of a hurricane-free shore.
The collective understanding of the ‘38 hurricane that emerges from oral histories is selfconscious of the community’s tendency to misremember or forget the power of hurricanes.
Following the 1635 hurricane William Bradford wrote of a “mighty storm of wind and rain as
none living in these parts, either English or Indians ever saw. Being like to those Hauricanes and
Tuffons [sic] that writers make mention of in ye Ineas [sic].” 62 It is impossible to know if the
storm was an unprecedented as Bradford claimed, particularly given the Corps’ conclusion that
severe storms occurred at least once, if not twice a century, between 1635-1900. Bradford
maintained, just as Rhode Islanders would in 1938, the newness of an environmental event that
in all likelihood had a history that predated his experience. Hurricanes, it turned out, had
disappeared from local collective memory since Europeans first settled New England.
In the mid-twentieth century, Ted Metcalf captured the forgetting underway: “for a while,
people who had it wanted to rebuild, but nobody wanted to buy it. But then people forgot. After a
few years they forget this was a desert, that 200 people died here, that 50 cars were buried in
Weekapaug Pond with people in them.” 63 Metcalf’s “desert” analogy seems important to
memory production surrounding the disaster of 1938. A powerful hurricane can completely erase
a coastline, removing any physical reminders of flood lines that might assist communities in
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recalling past dangers. 64 On Rhode Island’s Atlantic beaches, bustling with summer colonies
suddenly appeared “desert-” like: uninhabited, unpeopled, undeveloped, vacant space. Perhaps
the extreme extent of destruction in ‘38 and lack of subsequent memorials to mark the erasure
enabled the misremembering of dangers inherent to the coast.
Neglected memories of New England hurricanes reveal the power inherent in forgetting.
“I think it was a good ten years before anybody even thought of building down there,” Harold
Browning explained. But he went on: “[i]t was only after pretty near a generation when people
forget and start all over again. I notice its being built up now [1977].” 65 Such redevelopment is a
reminder that recovered hurricane memories did not necessarily change local traditions of coastal
living. The desire to live on the beach, the U.S.’s devotion to private property rights, and
economic incentives of real estate development all contribute to active forgetting. 66 Robert W.
Kates, a geographer who specialized in coastal hazards wrote in the 1960s, described the typical
coastal resident, even individuals who had weathered a damaging hurricane, as exhibiting
a desire to deny hazard…coastal users are relatively well educated and well-to-do. They
have come to the shore to partake of the attractions found at the interface of land and sea
or to serve those who are so attracted. They are, by and large, knowing and well-informed
about the general nature of the hazard they face, and as to the details, they are little worse
off than the technical-scientific community. A high proportion of coastal dwellers take
minimal steps to reduce their hazard, but many of them elect to live at considerable risk
rather than reduce their seaward amenities. 67
Kates’s study of fifteen Eastern coastal communities—which included Point Judith in Rhode
Island—revealed that “despite the fact that ninety percent of…respondents experienced storms,
only two-thirds expect[ed] storms in the future. And although half of them suffered some
damage in the past, only a third expect[ed] a future storm to entail damage for themselves.” 68
The comment of one survivor of the ‘38 hurricane potently underscored that the social memory
of hurricanes does not lead inevitably to community resiliency and respect of environmental
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limits: “We’re still a pretty complacent bunch of people, you know. We have to be kicked hard
sometimes before we’ll move.” 69
Since geographer Gilbert F. White’s influential mid-twentieth century work on flood risk,
hazard scholars have written of the false sense of security that rigid flood protection systems
offer coastal communities. When asked to describe the government’s response to storm risks
survivors of the ‘38 hurricane pointed approvingly to protective structures of seawalls and the
Fox Point barrier as evidence that the government had “dealt” with storm threats. 70 Americans
have embraced technological solutions to coastal risk but proven far less eager to change
development habits along shore. Past calamities appear safely contained by engineering
structures, leading to increased urbanization in flood-prone areas. 71 Even with historic flood data
embedded in NFIP’s maps, these memories are, Colten points out frequented contested at the
local level as threats to development and economic growth. 72 Protests erupted in 2012, for
example, when Congress attempted to raise NFIP rates and update FIRMS. Protestors feared new
information on flooding risk would affect property owners’ pocket books and municipal tax
bases. In 2020 science writer Cornelia Dean summarized the problem: “for too long coastal
communities have bet everything on a combination of federal largess and engineering know-how
that was never sustainable… America’s biggest coastal mistake was creating federal subsidies
that enabled developers to escape the realities of nature and the market.” 73

Conclusion: The Future of Coastal Hazards
In the 1950s, the Army Corps of Engineers recommended protections for Narragansett
Bay based on a static model of the bay; yet coastlines are inherently dynamic, and the
accelerating climate crisis is magnifying this quality. In the twentieth-first century, Rhode
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Island’s coastal risks are evolving. Warming surface water temperatures are fostering rising sea
levels and stronger hurricanes. Future hurricane damage will increase as state’s coastal flood
zone, both on Narragansett Bay and on the Atlantic, migrates inland. Sea level rise will also
reduce the protections offered by coastal defenses. Between 1930 and 1970, sea level rise in
Rhode Island increased at an average of one inch per decade. In the 1970s, however, the rate
started to accelerate, and in the ensuing four decades the mean high tide line rose six inches. Not
only is sea level rise accelerating in the Ocean State, at a rate three to four times faster than the
global average, this acceleration is projected to further increase. 74 The Coastal Resources
Management Council (CRMC) projects sea levels will rise between three and five feet in Rhode
Island by 2100. 75
Critics of coastal armoring, the construction of physical structures meant to protect
coastlines and riparian structures from erosion or sea level rise, question whether inflexible
structures like the Fox Point barrier will successfully check future storm surges. 76 Engineering
works are designed on historic flood data; scholars of memory and environment disaster frame
such projects as evidence of social memory. 77 Yet the climate crisis will most likely render even
such active remembering and hazard mitigation plans, usually seen as a font of community
resilience, moot. 78 That neither existing Corps projects and FIRMs incorporate sea level rise
projections suggests the potential limitations of “active remembering” in informing resilient
coastal management in the face of the climate crisis.
The climate crisis will exacerbate hurricane risk for Rhode Island’s economy, essential
infrastructure, and residents in the coming century. By the early twenty-first century,
Narragansett Bay’s “Metro Bay region,” the area around greater Providence, housed a third of
the state’s 1.1 million residents. Populated at a density eight times greater than the remainder of
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the state, the region is home to residents and businesses as well as storage and distribution sites
of coal, oil, natural and liquefied gas, electricity, transportation and port infrastructure, medical
and education institutions, and sewage treatment plants. 79 The region also straddles Rhode
Island’s 100-year coastal zone floodplain, which both the ‘38 Hurricane and 1954’s Carol
inundated. Sea-level rise, erosion, storm events, and extended flood zones are the central hazards
threatening the Metro Bay region and the state at large. As the state Sea Grant and CRMC jointly
warned residents in 2014, “the ocean isn’t always the best neighbor.” 80 Yet whether public
support and political will exists to change coastal land use policies to reduce hurricane
vulnerability as climate change raises the stakes of coastal risk in the Ocean State remains to be
seen. 81
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